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Abstract. This paper critically analyses the proposed Australian regulatory approach to the 
crediting of biological sequestration activities (biosequestration) under the Australian Carbon 
Farming Initiative and its interaction with State-based carbon rights, the national carbon-pricing 
mechanism, and the international Kyoto Protocol and carbon-trading markets. Norms and 
principles have been established by the Kyoto Protocol to guide the creation of additional, 
verifiable, and permanent credits from biosequestration activities. This paper examines the 
proposed arrangements under the Australian Carbon Farming Initiative and Carbon Pricing 
Mechanism to determine whether they are consistent with those international norms and 
standards. This paper identifies a number of anomalies associated with the legal treatment of 
additionality and permanence and issuance of carbon credits within the Australian schemes. In 
light of this, the paper considers the possible legal implications for the national and international 




The Australian government has committed to a reduction in national carbon emissions 
of 5 per cent below 2000 levels by 2020 and 80 per cent below 2000 levels by 2050.1 
The Government’s principal proposed measure for addressing emissions involves the 
imposition of a price on carbon in conjunction with a trading mechanism, known as the 
Carbon Pricing Mechanism (CPM).2 The government has also passed legislation to 
establish an incentive scheme for landholders for the creation and trade of carbon-offset 
credits, known as the Carbon Farming Initiative (CFI).3 The CPM seeks to harness 
economic incentives to encourage greenhouse gas emission reductions to occur in the 
most cost-effective manner. This approach holds a select group of the community liable 
for their emissions to the atmosphere in order to protect the common good of the 
community and the environment.  
 
There is a potentially significant role for biosequestration to play in offsetting 
Australia’s gross emissions and providing net emission reductions. Offset credits assist 
in placing a price on pollution through the integration of costs and debits into economic 
decision-making and in the promotion of behavioural changes towards the norm of 
 
* Senior Lecturer and Vice-Chancellor’s Research Fellow, Faculty of Law/Institute for Sustainable 
Resources, Queensland University of Technology, Brisbane, Australia. The author acknowledges receipt 
of funding from the Australian Research Council, Discovery Project 1094061 “An integrated legal regime 
for a sustainable carbon cycle”. 
1 Securing a Clean Energy Future: The Australian Government’s Climate Change Plan, Australian 
Government, Chapter Two-Targets for Action (2011), available at 
<http://www.cleanenergyfuture.gov.au/wp-content/uploads/2011/07/Consolidated-Final.pdf>. 
2 Clean Energy Act 2011 (Cth),  [hereinafter ‘Clean Energy Act’].  
3 Carbon Credits (Carbon Farming Initiative) Act 2011 (Cth) [hereinafter ‘CFI Act’]. 
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“avoid, mitigate, and offset”.4 However, to reach their full potential, offsets should be 
established in a manner which is perceived as being fair and stable with robust quality-
assurance processes.5 To play a positive role in  greenhouse gas mitigation efforts, 
eligible offset credits should be environmentally credible, useful, and hold value in the 
market. Accordingly, these carbon schemes should credit only those emissions removals 
that are additional, permanent, measurable, and verifiable. Norms and standards 
reflecting these principles have been established at an international level for the creation 
and recognition of biosequestration offset credits under the Kyoto Protocol.6 Those 
credits hold value in the carbon market because they can be used to assist Annex I 
parties in meeting their emission-reduction targets. This paper will examine the rules 
and processes under the Australian CFI in light of the rules established under the Kyoto 
Protocol for CDM biosequestration projects. Critical links between the CFI, CPM and 
international carbon trading markets will also be identified. This paper will conclude 
that a legal disconnect currently exists between the norms and standards of the Kyoto 
Protocol, Australian state-based recognition of property rights in carbon, the imposition 
of liability for emissions under the Australian CPM and the rights to create carbon 
credits under the CFI. This paper cautions that there is a need for greater legal 
responsibility to be imposed in relation to the creation, sale, and use of credits from 
biosequestration projects to ensure that credible abatement is occuring within Australia. 
Without this, the end result may be a regime that fails to make a meaningful 
contribution to global mitigation efforts. 
 
II. BIOSEQUESTRATION OFFSETS UNDER THE KYOTO PROTOCOL 
 
The Kyoto Protocol acted as a catalyst for the creation of tradeable carbon credits as 
incentives to promote reductions in globalgreenhouse gas emissions while encouraging 
the use of offset credits. The Kyoto Protocol aims to achieve the global reduction of 
greenhouse gas emissions by committing Annex I parties, including Australia, to 
binding targets.7 It aims to achieve emission reductions globally at the place where it is 
most cost-effective to do so. As is well known, each Annex I party has been assigned a 
number of Assigned Amount Units for the period 2008-2012. It may purchase 
additional AAUs through the international emissions trading market.8 It may also create 
Certified Emission Reduction Units through the implementation of CDM projects in 
developing countries.9 CDM afforestation and reforestation biosequestration activities 
are permitted.10 Emission-reduction projects may also be implemented under the Joint 
 
4 State of Biodiversity Markets Report: Offsets and Compensation Programs Worldwide, Ecosystem 
Marketplace, at 2 and passim (2010), available at 
<http://www.ecosystemmarketplace.com/documents/acrobat/sbdmr.pdf> [hereinafter ‘the Biodiversity 
Markets Report’]. 
5 Ibid., at xviii; National Carbon Offset Standard, Australian Government Department of Climate Change 
and Energy Efficiency, version 1 (2009), available at 
<http://www.climatechange.gov.au/government/initiatives/~/media/publications/carbon-
accounting/revised-NCOS-standard-2010-pdf.ashx>. 
6 Kyoto Protocol to the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change, opened for signature 
16 March 1998 (entered into force on 16 February 2005). 
7 Kyoto Protocol, art. 3(1).  
8 Kyoto Protocol, art. 17. 
9 Kyoto Protocol, art. 12. 
10 Kyoto Protocol, art. 12.5.  
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Implementation mechanism.11 The Kyoto Protocol permits JI projects in forest 
management, reforestation, and afforestation.  
 
The mechanisms are intended to be used as a supplement to direct domestic action to 
reduce or mitigate greenhouse gas emissions.12 Accordingly, they follow the hierarchy 
of compensatory mitigation more generally; that is: 
 
 the polluter must first take all reasonable and practicable steps to avoid all 
impacts; 
 if impacts are unavoidable then the impacts must be minimized; 
 the remainder of impacts should be compensated through the provision of an 
appropriate offset.13 
 
The polluter can generate the offsets itself; offsets can be purchased from a third party; 
or there may be payment into a broader compensation fund held by the government.14 
These approaches are consistent with the “polluter-pays principle”, as the system of 
credits and debits can be used to integrate environmental costs into economic decision 
making.15 The Kyoto Protocol and the Australian CPM adopt all three approaches in 
some shape or form. First, they permit the generation of offsets in accordance with set 
standards and principles. Second, they permit trade in these abatement credits to enable 
the purchase of offsets from third parties. The third option presents itself in the form of 
a financial penalty for non-compliance in the Australian approach, with an added ban on 
trading under the Kyoto Protocol. However, these approaches do not follow the 
approach taken with biodiversity offsets more generally. In those cases,  a suitable 
offset is required to be legally secured by the polluter prior to the occurrence of the 
polluting event.16 
 
III. THE AUSTRALIAN APPROACH TO EMISSIONS ABATEMENT: CARBON LIABILITIES AND 
MARKET CAPS  
 
The Australian CPM is intended to send a price signal to the market to influence 
emitting behaviours and reduce Australia’s national emissions in an environmentally 
effective and cost-effective manner.17 The CPM will commence on 1 July 2012 and will 
initially operate as a fixed charge per emission allowance.18 During the fixed-charge 
period, international emissions units will not be able to be surrendered in compliance 
 
11 Kyoto Protocol, art. 6. 
12 Domestic actions must constitute a ‘significant element’ of the efforts made by each party to meet its 
target under the Kyoto Protocol: Decision 15/CP.7 on Principles, nature and scope of the mechanisms 
pursuant to Articles 6, 12 and 17 of the Kyoto Protocol, 2, FCCC/CP/2001/13/Add.2 (21 January 2002); 
Kyoto Protocol, arts 5,7,8. 
13 Biodiversity Markets Report, supra note 4, at 5. 
14 Ibid., at vii. 
15 Ibid., at 1. 
16 Ibid., at 16. See, for example, Environmental Offsets: Conditions on Approval, Queensland 
Government, 1 (March 2011). 
17 Commentary on the Clean Energy Bill 2011, Australian Government Department of Climate Change 
and Energy Efficiency, 11 (2011) [hereinafter ‘Clean Energy Commentary’]. 
18 Ibid., at 12. 
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with the CPM.19 On 1 July 2015, the CPM is intended to transition to a flexible-price 
period. For the first three years, the price will not be “fully flexible”, as a price ceiling 
and price floor will apply to the market.20 During the flexible-price period, eligible 
international units may be acquired and surrendered in compliance with the CPM.21 
Eligible international units currently include the following units issued under the Kyoto 
Protocol: CERs from the CDM (other than a long-term or temporary CERs issued in 
relation to CDM forestry projects); ERUs generated by JI projects; and removal units 
(RMUs).22 The government has indicated that other restrictions may be imposed on the 
types of eligible international units.23 
 
One of the most important features of an effective “cap and trade” market is the 
presence of a comprehensive cap or limit on the number of permits released to the 
market.24  This cap acts as a volumetric control to ensure that greenhouse gas emissions, 
and atmospheric concentrations, will decline in accordance with the global reduction 
trajectory.25 The limit placed on available permits will create a “scarcity value” or price 
signal, a key element in modifying emitting behaviours of consumers and industry.26 
During the flexible-price period and until 2020, at least 50 per cent of a liable party’s 
compliance obligation must be met through the use of Australian units or credits rather 
than through the purchase of international units.27 This will have the effect of increasing 
the prescribed “market cap” for Australia by an additional 50 per cent. Australia’s 
independent advisor, Professor Garnaut, has stressed that “the integrity of the trajectory 
and the overall emissions budget is paramount in order to satisfy the scarcity 
principle.”28 This increased supply  of credits could distort the price signal and this, in 
turn, could undermine the environmental effectiveness and economic efficiency of the 
Australian carbon market.29 As Garnaut has cautioned, “most damaging of all would be 
measures that rendered ineffective the credibility of the quantitative restriction (the 
emissions limit) on which the entire emissions trading scheme is predicated.”30 
 
Garnaut also recommended to the government that, to be effective, coverage of the 
Australian scheme should be as broad as possible, subject to practical constraints 
imposed by the measurability of emissions and transaction costs.31 The CPM will 
 
19 Ibid., at 92. 
20 The price ceiling will be initially set at $20 above the expected international price and the price floor 
will be set at $15. Clean Energy Commentary, at 12. 
21 Ibid., at 33 
22 Australian National Registry of Emissions Units Act 2011 (Cth), s. 4. 
23 Including restrictions on removal units (RMUs) issued on the basis of land use, land-use change and 
forestry activities under Article 3.3 or 3.4 of the Kyoto Protocol and CERs or ERUs from nuclear 
projects, the destruction of trifluoromethane, the destruction of nitrous oxide from adipic acid plants or 
from large-scale hydro-electric projects not consistent with criteria adopted by the EU (based on the 
World Commission on Dams guidelines). See Clean Energy Commentary, supra note 17, at 93. 
24 Final Report to the Commonwealth, State and Territory Governments of Australia, Garnaut Climate 
Change Review, 314 (2008) [hereinafter ‘Garnaut Review’],  
25 Ibid., at 317, 322. 
26 Ibid., at 311-312. 
27 Clean Energy Commentary, supra note 17, at 33; Clean Energy Bill Part 6. 
28 Garnaut Review, supra note 24, at 325. 
29 Ibid., at 311. 
30 Ibid., at 314. 
31 Garnaut Review, supra note 24, at 326. 
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encompass members of the stationary energy sector, select areas of the transport sector 
(domestic aviation, shipping, rail), industrial processes, non-legacy waste, and fugitive 
emissions.32 Agriculture and forestry are excluded despite Garnaut’s recommendation 
that the land sector should be included once measurement and monitoring concerns 
were resolved.33 There is a significant point of difference between the CPM and the 
proposed (but ultimately abandoned) Carbon Pollution Reduction Scheme (CPRS) of 
2010. In that scheme, forest landholders were able to “opt in” eligible reforestation 
activities and generate permanent tradeable credits from net sequestration.34 Where 
sequestration levels dropped, the project proponent was a liable entity and required to 
surrender permits for its net emissions. 
 
By including reforestation as a liable entity within the CPRS, the government had 
sought to avoid the administrative issues and compliance costs associated with ensuring 
that forestry credits were additional to business as usual and permanently maintained.35 
The government noted: 
the Garnaut Review suggests that reforestation be eligible to generate offset credits. This would 
achieve a very similar outcome to scheme coverage – that is, crediting increases in forest carbon 
– but would involve additional compliance costs for both industry and government. These would 
arise because of the need to demonstrate that forest carbon meets international offset standards, 
namely that it will be permanently maintained and is additional to business as usual.36  
 
Under the revised Australian approach, offset credits will be generated in Australia 
under a separate CFI scheme. During the fixed-charge period, liable entities will be 
permitted to surrender up to 5 per cent of eligible credits from the CFI (to be known as 
Australian Carbon Credit Units) to satisfy their liabilities under the CPM.37 Once the 
flexible-charge period commences, there will be no restrictions on the number of 
eligible CFI credits able to be surrendered under the CPM.38 This will again have the 
effect of increasing the allocated “market cap” under the CPM, which is likely to further 
weaken the price signal sent to emitters to reduce their carbon emissions. 
 
CFI credits that are not Kyoto compliant will not be permitted under the CPM. Non-
Kyoto-compliant credits created under the CFI (ineligible credits) could be sold to the 
voluntary market, exported overseas, or sold to the government, which announced an 
 
32 Clean Energy Act, Part 3. 
33 Garnaut Review, supra note 24, at 358; Update Paper No 4: Transforming Rural Land Use, Garnaut 
Climate Change Review, 49 (2011). The New Zealand emissions trading scheme will include the 
agriculture sector from 2015 with the point of obligation initially placed with processors rather than farms 
Climate Change Response Act 2002 (NZ); Climate Change (Agriculture Sector)Regulations 2010 (NZ). 
34 Carbon Pollution Reduction Scheme Bill 2010, Part 10.  
35 Carbon Pollution Reduction Scheme Green Paper, Australian Government, Department of Climate 
Change, 127 (2008). 
36 Ibid. For further discussion see Nicola Durrant, Legal Responses to Climate Change, Chapter 12-Legal 
Issues in Biosequestration (2010). 
37 Subject to the regulations, these will include Kyoto-compliant carbon credits under the CFI and non-
Kyoto compliant carbon credits issued for eligible offsets projects where a Kyoto-compliant credit would 
have been issued if the reporting period had ended before the Kyoto abatement deadline (as defined under 
the CFI Act), Clean Energy Act, s. 5; Clean Energy Commentary, supra note 17, at 119. 
38 Clean Energy Commentary, supra note 17, at 94. 
  6
AU$250 million government fund for this purpose.39 With the exception of units under 
the CFI, Australian carbon units (ACUs) will not be permitted to be exported 
internationally while the domestic price floor/ceiling is in place.40 This statutory 
restriction will be lifted once the price constraints are removed.41 
 
IV. THE AUSTRALIAN APPROACH TO OFFSETS: BIOSEQUESTRATION UNDER THE CARBON 
FARMING INITIATIVE 
 
The CFI is an economic incentive scheme designed to enable farmers and other land 
managers to undertake eligible offsets projects and to be rewarded by additional income 
from the sale of carbon credits generated under the scheme.42 The Clean Energy 
Regulator (the regulator) will administer both the CPM and the CFI.43 Key elements in 
the application of the CFI scheme to biosequestration projects are analyzed below.  
 
1. Eligible CFI Offsets Projects 
To commence an offsets project, an application must be made to the regulator to declare 
that the project is an eligible offsets project. At the time of making the declaration, the 
regulator must consider, among other matters, whether the project is consistent with any 
applicable regional natural-resource management plan.44 Applicants must also meet the 
Australian Commonwealth’s “fit and proper person” test, including whether the person 
has previously breached the CFI, CPM, or national emission-reporting legislation.45 
This declaration under the CFI does not exempt the project proponent from the need to 
obtain all relevant regulatory approvals under relevant Commonwealth, State, or 
Territory legislation.46 Prior to a project being declared to be an eligible offsets project, 
all persons who hold an eligible interest in the land must have consented to the making 
of the application.47 The Kyoto Protocol’s CDM contains an additional prerequisite for 
approval and requires that the project proponent consult with local landholders and that 
it obtain written evidence from the host country that the project will assist the nation in 
achieving sustainable development.48 These requirements are not incorporated into the 
Australian CFI scheme. However the scheme does allow for certain projects to be listed 
as “excluded offsets projects” where there is a significant risk that the project will have 
a significant adverse impact on the availability of water, conservation of biodiversity, or 
employment in the local community, among other considerations.49 The CFI also 
contains a duty to notify the regulator if the project is changed in such a way as to 
 
39 Ibid., at 16. 
40 Unless an appropriate bilateral linkage is in place. 
41 Clean Energy Commentary, supra note 17, at 92. 
42 Ibid., at 42. 
43 Ibid., at 34. 
44 CFI Act, Part 3, Division 2. 
45 CFI Act, Part 4. 
46 CFI Act, Part 3, Division 2.  
47 CFI Act, Part 3, Division 2. All legal estate or interests registered under a Torrens system of 
registration are ‘eligible interests’ as are mortgagees or chargees over those eligible interests where those 
mortgages or charges are registered under the Torrens system of registration. For Crown land, the 
Minister of the State or Territory is taken to hold an eligible interest with respect to an area of land.  
48 Decision 3/CMP.1 on Modalities and procedures for a clean development mechanism as defined in 
Article 12 of the Kyoto Protocol, section F, FCCC/KP/CMP/2005/8/Add.1 (30 March 2006). 
49 CFI Act, Part 3, Division 12. 
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become inconsistent with any applicable regional natural-resource management plan.50 
However, it should be noted that there are no additional provisions in the CFI to require 
that the project is consistent with those regional plans. 
 
2. Eligible Carbon Sequestration Rights 
 
The project proponent must be the person responsible for the project with the “legal 
right” to carry out the project and who holds the applicable carbon-sequestration right 
in relation to the project area.51 These rights are not established under the CFI 
legislation and must be obtained separately.52 The legal right to carry out the project 
must be sufficient to manage the relevant carbon pool, for example through ownership 
of the project area or via “a forestry right or carbon management right attached to a 
carbon sequestration right.”53 The CFI defines an applicable carbon-sequestration right 
to be “the exclusive legal right to obtain the benefit (whether present or future) of 
sequestration of carbon in the relevant carbon pool on the area of land.”54 If the right 
relates to an area of Torrens system land, the right is required to be either registered on 
the Torrens system of registration or noted on the certificate of title, and the right must 
be an estate or interest in land, or otherwise have the effect of running with the land.55  
 
On land that is general law land (neither Torrens system land nor Crown land) carbon-
sequestration rights are not recognized by the CFI.56 On Crown land, the exclusive right 
to obtain the benefit of the carbon must be a legal interest in land; a legal right that is an 
interest in land; or a right which runs with the land.57 The carbon sequestration right 
may be held by the Crown rather than the lease holder.58 For applications where the 
project area is Crown land, the principal State or Territory Minister is required to certify 
in writing that the applicant holds the applicable carbon sequestration right in relation to 
the project area; and that the State or Territory will not deal with the project area, and 
will not consent to any other person dealing with the project area, in a way that is 
inconsistent with the carbon sequestration right.59 These requirements are likely to 
cause complications given that they do not appear to align with standard leasehold 
practices at the State level. For example, in some jurisdictions, such as the State of 
Queensland, there has been a move towards much shorter lease periods of ten to thirty 
years, making it impossible for landholders to demonstrate that they have the legal right 
to enter the land and carry out these sequestration activities throughout the one-
hundred-year life of the project.60 There are also uncertainties surrounding the ability of 
lease holders to obtain consent from the State and Territory Minister, as required by the 
 
50 CFI Act, s. 83. 
51 CFI Act, ss. 5, 43. 
52 Carbon Credits (Carbon Farming Initiative) Bill 2011 Explanatory Memorandum, The Parliament of 
the Commonwealth of Australia, 27 (2011) [hereinafter ‘CFI Explanatory Memorandum’]. 
53 Ibid., at 28. 
54 CFI Act, s. 43. 
55 CFI Act, s. 43. 
56 CFI Explanatory Memorandum, supra note 54, at 29. 
57 CFI Act, s. 43. 
58 CFI Act, s. 43. 
59 CFI Act, s. 43. 
60 See Waste Reduction and Recycling Bill 2011 Explanatory Notes, the Parliament of the State of 
Queensland, 14 (2011) [hereafter ‘Waste Reduction Explanatory Notes’]; Biodiversity Markets Report, 
supra note 4, at 53. 
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CFI, and claim the applicable carbon sequestration rights. This is owing to the presence 
of standard lease conditions which state that the trees and vegetation on the land remain 
the property of the State and Territory governments.61  
 
3. Links between the CFI and State-based Recognition of Carbon Rights 
 
Most Australian jurisdictions use property law mechanisms to recognize the right to 
own carbon sequestered in the trees and vegetation on land separate from the rights 
relating to the land itself. This is generally achieved through the creation of forestry 
rights and carbon-sequestration rights using the property law mechanisms of profit à 
prendre, chose in action, or covenant.62 By deeming these rights to be, for example, a 
common law profit à prendre, the legislation provides the holder of these rights with an 
interest in the land recorded on title. However, traditionally, a profit à prendre has 
related to the right to take things from the land rather than rights to keep them there, as 
occurs with carbon sequestration. Similar difficulties are encountered when attempting 
to characterize this interest as a chose in action or covenant. Covenants running with the 
land, for example, are conventionally associated with negative covenants rather than 
covenants for the benefit of a particular person. As a result, real difficulties can arise in 
the application of these conventional concepts of property law, with their very specific 
meanings and connotations, to the novel concept of carbon-sequestration rights.63  
 
There are many different approaches and terminologies to carbon rights across 
Australia. The Australian government has noted the inconsistency of treatment across 
the State jurisdictions and previously conceded that “rights created under some State 
legislative regimes may not be sufficiently enforceable to enable owners of these rights 
to participate in the [defunct CPRS] Scheme.”64 With the CFI proposal, the government 
has asserted that it has “taken into account the various circumstances in different 
jurisdictions.”65 However, it appears that many jurisdictions may need to amend their 
legislation in order to provide the long-term rights required by the CFI. The State of 
Victoria was the first State jurisidiction to pass amendments to bring its regime closer to 
the Australian government requirements. The Victorian Act expressly refers to the 
creation of an “exclusive right” and recognizes separate rights in relation to soil 
carbon.66 The State of Queensland has also recently followed suit with amendments to 
 
61 Durrant, supra note 36, at 161. Some of these uncertainties in the State of Queensland may be addressed 
by the recent passage of the Waste Reduction and Recycling Act 2011 (Qld), parts 4-7, and other 
amendments which will allow for the creation of a long-term carbon abatement interest in circumstances 
where the State is currently the owner of the carbon sequestration right. See Waste Reduction 
Explanatory Notes, supra note 62, at 13-15. 
62 Durrant, supra note 36, at 165-171. 
63 Samantha Hepburn, Carbon rights as new property: the benefits of statutory verification 31 (2)  
Sydney L. Rev. 239 (2009); Samantha Hepburn, Carbon rights as new property: towards a uniform 
framework (paper presented to ANU College of Law seminar series, 21 August 2008), available at 
<http://law.anu.edu.au/news/2008_college_seminars.asp>; Pamela O’Connor, The extension of land 
registration principles to new property rights in environmental goods in Martin Dixon (eds.), Modern 
Studies in Property Law Vol 5. 363-385 (Hart Publishing, 2009); Durrant, supra note 36, at 161-174 
64 Carbon Pollution Reduction Scheme: Australia’s Low Pollution Future, Australian Government, 6.50 
(2008). 
65 CFI Explanatory Memorandum, supra note 54, at 28. 
66 Climate Change Act 2010 (Vic), s. 25. 
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allow for the creation of an exclusive right in the form of a newly defined long-term 
“carbon abatement interest” that includes soil carbon.67  
 
The government has acknowledged the difficulties of using exclusive legal rights as a 
prerequisite for engagement in the CFI not only in relation to Crown leases but also in 
the context of native title. (Under the native title doctrine, the common law of Australia 
recognizes rights and interests to land held by Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander 
people under their traditional laws and customs.) The CFI enables certain native title 
land holders to participate in the CFI in the same way as interest holders in freehold 
land.68 It requires that there be a registered native title body corporate for the relevant 
area and that the native title holder has the exclusive legal right to the carbon-
sequestration rights.69 A number of special provisions have been inserted into the CFI to 
address the deemed project proponent for the project, requirements for consultation with 
other common law holders, and the use of special native title accounts.70 Further details 
are expected to be contained in the statutory regulations. Access to the CFI does not 
currently extend to non-exclusive native title, as the government considers that those 
non-exclusive rights are “less likely to include carbon sequestration rights.”71 
 
Clearly, there are a number of legal obstacles to be overcome in order for project 
proponents to meet the requirements of the CFI and demonstrate that they hold all the 
necessary legal rights to proceed with the biosequestration project. These provisions are 
legally complicated and most landholders will require expert assistance in order to 
determine whether they meet the threshold criteria for eligibility under the CFI. 
Negotiations with other State and Territory governments will also be required in order 
to more closely align State and Territory leasehold practices with the CFI requirements 
set by the Australian government. All of these aspects will lead to project uncertainty 
and this, in turn, will lead to additional transaction costs in the carrying out of these 
projects – something that should be avoided when seeking to design an effective market 
instrument.72  
 
4. Additionality Requirements in the CFI and CDM 
 
Under the CFI, an independent Domestic Offsets Integrity Committee will be 
responsible for advising the Commonwealth Minister on appropriate offset 
methodologies for eligible projects. These methodologies will contain the detailed rules 
for the baseline, implementation, monitoring, and generation of carbon credits under the 
CFI.73 The methodologies are required to comply with the Offsets Integrity Standards 
specified in the CFI legislation, this requires abatement to meet a specified test of 
additionality, be measurable and capable of verification, and, with respect to 
sequestration projects, provide for adjustments in cyclical levels of sequestration across 
a one-hundred-year period.74  
 
67 Waste Reduction and Recycling Act 2011 (Qld) parts 4-7. 
68 CFI Explanatory Memorandum, supra note 54, at 37.  
69 CFI Act, Part 3, Division 8. 
70 CFI Act, Part 3, Division 10. 
71 CFI Explanatory Memorandum, supra note 54, at 40. 
72 Garnaut Review, supra note 24, at 321. 
73 CFI Act, Part 9. 
74 CFI Act, Part 9, Division 3. 
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The CDM mechanism under the Kyoto Protocol was one of the first examples of an 
international market-based offset mechanism designed to contribute to global efforts to 
reduce atmospheric concentrations of greenhouse gases. Given this, it is important to 
consider whether the Australian CFI aligns with the international offset standards that 
have been established for biosequestration projects under the CDM.  
 
For a CDM project to be registered and approved for implementation under the Kyoto 
Protocol, the project documentation must demonstrate that the project will result in 
reductions in emissions that are “additional” to any that would have occurred in the 
absence of the CDM project. Under the CDM rules, the baseline against which 
additionality is demonstrated is a hypothetical reference case based on multiple 
assumptions.75 The project baseline must take into account all realistic and credible 
land-use scenarios that would have occurred on the land within the proposed project 
boundary in the absence of the registered afforestation and reforestation project under 
the CDM, including continuation of the pre-project land use; afforestation and 
reforestation of the land within the project boundary performed without being registered 
as the CDM project; and forestation of part of the land within the project boundary of 
the proposed CDM project resulting from legal requirements (such as prohibitions on 
clearing) or extrapolation of observed forestation activities in the geographical area with 
similar socioeconomic and ecological conditions (since 31 December 1989).76  The 
CDM project must also demonstrate that without the revenue from the sale of CERs, the 
proposed project activity is economically or financially less attractive than at least one 
of the other land-use scenarios (financial additionality).77 The baseline must further take 
into account any barriers that would prevent the implementation of the project if the 
activity were not registered under the CDM.78  
 
The CDM is not a perfect tool and the test of additionality has been criticized for being 
both complex and subjective.79 These aspects have led to higher transaction costs in the 
carrying out of a project type which clearly “does not in itself lead to any global 
reduction in emissions.”80 These concerns regarding the weaknesses of the CDM appear 
to have influenced the Australian government in its design of the CFI.In contrast to the 
CDM, under the CFI activities are deemed to have met the additionality test where they 
are contained on the “positive list” in the CFI regulations and are not in response to a 
requirement under any law of the Commonwealth, State, or Territory.81 In considering 
activities for inclusion on the positive list, the Minister must have regard to the advice 
of the Domestic Offsets Integrity Committee and must consider whether the carrying 
 
75 UNFCCC Secretariat, Decision 4/CMP.1 on Guidance Relating to the Clean Development Mechanism. 
Annex II: Procedures for Review as Referred to in Paragraph 41 of the Clean Development Mechanism 
Modalities and Procedures, FCCC/KP/CMP/2005/8/Add 1, Annex, Appendix B [2]. 
76 Report of the CDM Executive Board No 35, Annex 17: A/R Methodological Tool, Tool for the 
Demonstration and Assessment of Additionality in Afforestation/ Reforestation CDM Project Activities, 
UNFCCC Secretariat (2005).  
77 Ibid. 
78 Ibid. 
79 Durrant, supra note 36, at 61. 
80 Garnaut Review, supra note 24, at 182. 
81 CFI Act, s. 41. 
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out of the project is “not common practice” in the relevant industry or environment.82 
Financial additionality is not required to be demonstrated. Baseline setting has also been 
simplified under the CFI and this is stated simply as being calculated on the assumption 
that the project is not carried out.83 While these modifications have come from a desire 
to reduce transaction costs, the lack of compatibility with the rules of the CDM will 
have consequences in terms of the ability to surrender CFI credits as eligible offsets 
under the post-2012 Kyoto Protocol regime and other linked international carbon 
markets.  Furthermore, only time will tell whether these relaxed additionality 
requirements will lead to regrettable instances of “double counting” in Australia’s 
domestic mitigation efforts. 
 
 
5. Treatment of Kyoto-Compliant and Non-Kyoto-Compliant Projects 
 
The types of project permitted under the scheme will include both Kyoto-compliant and 
non-Kyoto-compliant activities, including emission-avoidance offsets projects 
(agricultural, landfill, introduced-animals) and sequestration offsets projects (living 
biomass, dead organic matter, soil).84  Methodologies are in the process of being 
developed for the CFI and these will identify the applicable measurement and 
monitoring protocols and other technical requirements for the different project types.  
 
A diverse range of methodologies have been released for public consultation to date. 
These include reforestation; savanna-fire management; landfill gas recovery; manure 
management in intensive livestock farming (piggeries); and, rather unusually, feral 
animal management (camel culling).85 Future methodologies are likely to address 
native-forest protection projects (avoided deforestation), soil-carbon sequestration, and 
biochar.86 These more controversial activities are not currently recognised as eligible 
offset projects under the CDM.   
 
The CFI will generate Kyoto-compliant or non-Kyoto-compliant tradeable credits 
depending on the type of project and its eligibility under the Kyoto Protocol. In the 
meantime, the Australian government is seeking to expand the types of eligible 
activities under the Kyoto Protocol, to include soil carbon and avoided deforestation, as 
part of its international negotiations for the post-2012 legal regime. 
 
 
6. Monitoring and Reporting Obligations for Biosequestration Projects  
 
 
82 CFI Act, Part 9, Division 3. 
83 CFI Act, s. 107. 
84 CFI Act, Part 3, Division 12. 
85 ‘Carbon Farming Initiative: Offset Methodologies, Australian Government, Department of Climate 
Change and Energy Efficiency, available at 
<http://www.climatechange.gov.au/government/initiatives/carbon-farming-initative/methodology-
development/methodologies-under-consideration.aspx>. 
86 A native forest is defined to exclude plantations. However, the definition notes that “it is immaterial 
whether any of the trees have been established with human assistance following flood; bushfire; drought; 
pest attack; or disease”, CFI Act, s. 5. 
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The CFI scheme relies on ongoing monitoring and reporting obligations to ensure that 
real, verifiable, and environmentally credible abatement is occurring under the scheme. 
As a result, there are obligations for regular reporting of emissions abatement under the 
scheme as well as powers granted to the regulator for auditing and monitoring.87 Under 
the CFI, the reporting period for the project cannot be shorter than twelve months or 
longer than five years.88 Project proponents are required to provide an offsets report for 
their projects.89 That report must be accompanied by a prescribed independent audit 
report to verify its findings.90 (Under the CDM, too, emission reductions must be 
independently verified.91) 
 
Non-compliance with the CFI duty to report is a strict liability offence and it is not 
necessary to prove negligence, recklessness, intention, or knowledge.92 However the 
defence of mistake of fact applies to all offences under the CFI.93 Pecuniary penalties 
apply for non-compliance to both the project proponent and any persons who assist or 
induce the contravention of the scheme. Executive officers will also be liable for the 
offences of their body corporate where they knew or were reckless or negligent as to 
whether the contravention would occur; where they were in a position to influence the 
conduct of the body corporate; and where they failed to take all reasonable steps to 
prevent the contravention.94 The maximum penalty for a body corporate is 10,000 
penalty units per offence (2,000 for an individual).95 
 
7. The Nature of the CFI Credits from Biosequestration Projects 
 
To positively contribute to the reduction of atmospheric concentrations of greenhouse 
gases, these biosequestration offset projects should deliver environmentally credible 
abatement in the form of the absolute removal of greenhouse gases from the 
atmosphere. However, emissions reductions from biosequestration suffer from a 
significant permanence risk. Sequestered carbon can be released to the atmosphere as a 
result of land clearing, timber harvesting, bushfires, disease, and decay of the trees. 
Because of this, the Kyoto Protocol creates only short-term credits for afforestation and 
reforestation projects under the CDM. A “temporary” CER expires at the end of the 
commitment period following the one during which it was issued.96 A “long-term” CER 
expires at the end of the crediting period of the activity for which it was issued.97 The 
crediting period may be for a maximum of 20 years, renewed twice, or a maximum of 
 
87 CFI Act, Parts 18-19. 
88 CFI Act, Part 6, Division 2. 
89 CFI Act, Part 6. 
90 CFI Act, Part 6. 
91 Decision 3/CMP.1 on Modalities and procedures for a clean development mechanism as defined in 
Article 12 of the Kyoto Protocol, section D, 11, FCCC/KP/CMP/2005/8/Add.1 (30 March 2006). 
92 CFI Act, s. 231. 
93 CFI Act, s. 230. 
94 CFI Act, s. 217. 
95 CFI Act, s. 221. 
96 UNFCCC Secretariat, Decision 5/CMP.1 on Modalities and Procedures for Afforestation and 
Deforestation Project Activities under the Clean Development Mechanism in the First Commitment 
Period of the Kyoto Protocol –Annex: Modalities and Procedures for a Clean Development Mechanism, 
62, UNFCCC/KP/CMP/2005/8/Add.1, 62. 
97 Ibid. 
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30 years.98 The CDM addresses the permanence risk by requiring that the CDM project 
developer replace the affected temporary or long-term CERs if the amount of 
sequestered carbon in a biosequestration project is reduced during that crediting period.   
 
Regrettably, this permanence approach has not been adhered to in the Australian 
context, where the CFI purports to provide a permanent abatement for each permanent 
carbon credit issued. Permanent Australian Carbon Credit Units (ACCUs) will be issued 
for the greenhouse gas removals generated by each CFI project.99 These units are 
described as being personal property and transmissible by assignment, by will, and by 
devolution by operation of law.100  
 
Under the CFI, the total number of credits to be issued for each of these projects will be 
determined in accordance with the applicable methodological determination for the 
activity.101 For sequestration projects, a risk reversal buffer of 5 per cent will be 
subtracted from the total calculated net abatement/sequestration number. This is similar 
to the US CCX scheme, which applied a discount factor to act as a buffer, and 
established a carbon reserve pool to address the risk of reversal of emission removals as 
a result of natural disturbances and catastrophic events.102 Natural disturbance is defined 
in the CFI to include flood, bushfire, drought, pest attack, and disease but only in those 
circumstances where the event could not reasonably have been prevented by the project 
proponent.103 
 
8. Duty to Relinquish Credits for Loss of Carbon Stocks 
 
The CFI requires units to be relinquished in a number of circumstances, including 
where the issuance of the units is found to have been associated with false or misleading 
information; where the declaration of the sequestration offsets project as an eligible 
offsets project is varied or revoked; and where there is a complete or partial reversal in 
the sequestration levels of the project.104There is an obligation imposed on the project 
proponent to notify the regulator if there is a natural disturbance that causes, or is likely 
to cause, a reversal of the emissions removal.105  
 
It will be important for project proponents to understand that the occurrence of a natural 
disturbance does not provide the project proponent with complete protection from 
liability under the CFI. The project proponent may still be required to relinquish credits 
for the reversal where the reversal is, under the regulations, taken to be a “significant 
reversal”; the reversal is attributable to natural disturbance; and the regulator is not 
satisfied that the project proponent has, within a reasonable period, taken reasonable 
steps to mitigate the effect of the natural disturbance.106 Further guidelines on the 
 
98 Ibid., at 67, 79.  
99 CFI Act, Part 11, Division 2. 
100 CFI Act, Part 11, Division 3. The CFI Act notes that it does not affect the creation of; or any dealings 
with; or the enforcement of equitable interests in relation to an Australian carbon credit unit. 
101 CFI Act, Part 2, Division 3. 
102 US Chicago Climate Exchange, ‘Managed Forest Carbon Emission Offsets’, 2 (CCX, 2008).  
103 CFI Act, s. 5. 
104 CFI Act, Part 7. This must be done within 90 days of notice being issued by the regulator. 
105 CFI Act, s. 40. 
106 CFI Act, Part 7, Division 3. 
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parameters for these discretionary determinations will need to be developed. In the 
meantime, project proponents can take only minor comfort from the limited protections 
provided by these natural disturbance provisions. 
 
 
The CFI scheme generally requires that similar credits are relinquished in cases of 
reversal. If the project is an eligible Kyoto project, then Kyoto ACCUs will be 
required.107 Likewise, if the project is an eligible non-Kyoto project, then non-Kyoto 
ACCUs will be required.108 However, there is no requirement that they be generated 
from the same type of emission removal, avoidance, or abatement activity. Accordingly, 
it is possible that there may be differences between the environmental credibility of the 
issued credits and replacement credits, particularly in light of the inclusion of more 
novel activities, such as avoided deforestation and soil sequestration, within the CFI 
scheme. 
 
Importantly, the obligation to relinquish credits under the CFI is not absolute. If the 
project proponent fails to relinquish the total number of required credits by the due date, 
an administrative penalty is payable.109 The penalty is the greatest of either 200 per cent 
of the market value of the category of credits required to be relinquished (being Kyoto-
compliant or non-Kyoto-compliant) or AU$20 multiplied by the number of required 
units.110 This amount is due and payable at the end of thirty days, and, if unpaid, a late 
penalty of 20 per cent per annum will apply.111 The design of the CFI scheme clearly 
assumes that these project participants, which will include Australian farmers and other 
landholder, will hold sufficient funds to acquire credits and/or pay these administrative 
penalties if they fall into non-compliance with the scheme.  
 
9. Legal Mechanisms for Maintaining Carbon Stocks on the Land 
 
If the relinquishment notice is not complied with within ninety days, or if the regulator 
is satisfied that it is not likely to be complied with, then a carbon maintenance 
obligation may be imposed over the land in relation to the project.112 This carbon-
maintenance obligation will have the effect of placing a restriction on the use of the 
land. Unless the conduct is declared to be a permitted carbon activity, it will be an 
offence under the CFI Act to engage in, aid, induce, or conspire conduct that is likely to 
result in a reduction below the benchmark sequestration level on the land.113 Since the 
obligation attaches to the land, rather than to an individual, the making of the 
declaration will affect all persons with an interest in the land, in addition to the project 
proponent. It is also likely to have a significant effect on the market value of the land. 
 
107 This may include the “substitute units” of a CER (other than a temporary CER or long-term CER); an 
ERU; RMU; an AAU issued in Australia; and any other prescribed eligible carbon unit. CFI Act, s. 177. 
108 This may include the “substitute units” of Kyoto Australian carbon credit units; a CER (other than a 
temporary CER or long-term CER); an ERU; a RMU; an AAU issued in Australia; and any other 
prescribed eligible carbon unit, CFI Act, s. 178. 
109 CFI Act, s. 179. 
110 CFI Act, Part 15, Division 3.  
111 CFI Act, Part 15, Division 3. 
112 CFI Act, Part 8. 
113 CFI Act, Part 8, Division 2. The benchmark sequestration level is the number of tonnes of carbon that 
was sequestered in the relevant carbon pool on the area or areas when the declaration was made. 
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The CFI Act will also impose a duty on the owner and occupier of the land to take all 
reasonable steps to ensure that the number of tonnes of carbon sequestered in the carbon 
pool on the land is not less than the benchmark sequestration level.114 Non-compliance 
may result in the imposition of pecuniary penalties.115 The regulator can also seek 
performance or restraining injunctions against particular individuals in relation to the 
project.116 
 
The CFI requires that details of all eligible offsets projects be listed on a public Register 
of Offsets Projects.117 The CFI Act notes that the relevant land-registration official 
“may” make entries or notations on the register to draw attention to the existence of the 
eligible offsets project and the fact that requirements may arise under the CFI.118 
However, this matter is left entirely to the discretion of the Australian States and 
Territories. This means that it may not be clear to new purchasers of land that they are 
acquiring their interest subject to the legal responsibilities imposed under the CFI. Even 
where a significant restriction has been imposed, in the form of a carbon-maintenance 
obligation, the discretion is again left with the State or Territory officials to make such 
entries or notations as they think appropriate.119 This leaves open the risk of persons 
purchasing land without the knowledge of the presence of the carbon-maintenance 
obligation or without adequate resources to ensure that those carbon-sequestration 
responsibilities are able to be met. This is an area where appropriate property law 
mechanisms could play a positive role in restricting future uses of the land, and 
preventing loss of carbon stocks, particularly where those instruments have the effect of 
running with the land and binding future successors in title. In New Zealand, for 
example, covenants are registered on title to require landowners to maintain permanent 
forests on their land. Those covenants are for a minimum fifty-year period.120  
 
It must be noted that this carbon maintenance obligation is not permanent. The 
declaration of a carbon-maintenance obligation over the land will be revoked if the 
required number of ACCUs is surrendered.121 Otherwise, the declaration will continue 
in force until either of the following occurs: the penalties payable in respect of non-
compliance with the CFI (including any late payment penalty) have been paid in full; or 
the end of the maximum potential relinquishment period for the project.122 That 
relinquishment period is currently set at one hundred years, although this number is able 





114 CFI Act, Part 8, Division 2. 
115 CFI Act, s. 221. 
116 CFI Act, Part 8, Division 3. 
117 CFI Act, Part 12, Division 5. 
118 CFI Act, Part 3, Division 5. 
119 CFI Act, s. 40. 
120 See New Zealand Government, Permanent Forest Sink Initiative, New Zealand Government Ministry 
of Agriculture and Forestry (2010), available at <www.maf.govt.nz/forestry/pfsi/ >. 
121 CFI Act, Part 8, Division 2. 
122 CFI Act, Part 8, Division 2. 
123 CFI Act, Part 7, Division 1. 
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10. Does the CFI Appropriately Address the Permanence Risk? 
 
The Australian government considers that these CFI arrangements adequately meet the 
“permanence” requirements for the generation of credits from biosequestration 
projects.124 However, there are a number of significant issues associated with the CFI 
regime, all of which will contribute to the overall effectiveness and environmental 
integrity of the CFI.  First, there is no overriding duty placed on project proponents in 
the CFI to ensure that the carbon stocks represented by issued carbon credits are 
maintained in the longer term. This loophole enables project proponents to “opt out” of 
their carbon sequestration duties simply by paying a series of administrative penalties. 
However, the payment of this penalty in itself will not address the lost levels of carbon 
stocks. Those sequestration levels will not be maintained or replaced unless the 
government elects to apply those funds to obtain its own alternate offsets. This is not 
currently proposed as part of the CFI framework. Second, there is no mechanism in 
place to cancel the CFI credits once the carbon stocks have been lost. This means that it 
will be possible for carbon credits generated from CFI activities to continue to circulate 
within domestic, and potentially international, markets purporting to represent a 
“permanent” sequestration that does not, in fact, exist. 
 
V.  IMPLICATIONS FOR THE TRANSFER, SURRENDER AND USE OF CFI CREDITS 
 
There are no restrictions placed on the sale of these CFI credits to the voluntary, 
domestic and international carbon markets. Once credits are sold on these markets to 
third parties, the purchaser of those permanent credits will have little or no recourse to 
the project proponent. The only available avenue may be reliance on weak contractual 
rights and duties. If the credit holder does not have a direct contractual relationship, it 
will be almost impossible to pursue legal action against the generator of the instrument 
to ensure that the carbon stocks within Australia are restored or maintained. The result 
may be a black hole where a credit is held, traded, and used nationally or internationally 
purporting to represent a credible sequestration where the sequestered carbon has been 
partially or completely reversed within Australia. Garnaut has cautioned against the 
introduction of a poorly designed scheme that could result in an environmentally 
ineffective and economically inefficient approach. As noted, “the most costly and 
damaging policy for Australia would be to implement a policy that was designed to 
appear meaningful, but was largely meaningless in application”, “[Australia’s] 
international credentials on this issue would be severely damaged.” 125 
 
However, the credibility of trading and using these biosequestration credits has 
implications that go beyond the environmental and economic effectiveness of the CPM 
and CFI frameworks. There will be a number of triggers for surrendering carbon-offset 
credits, including where an entity is required to “avoid, mitigate, or offset” as a 
condition of a building or planning approval; where the organization is seeking to be 
certified as carbon neutral; or where it otherwise makes a decision to voluntarily reduce 
 
124 CFI Act, s. 133, Note 2. 
125 Garnaut, supra note 24, 315. 
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its emissions.126 When credits are acquired and surrendered under the CPM, entities are 
not held responsible for ensuring that the abatement represented by those credits occurs 
and is maintained in the longer term. However, outside of the CPM, users of these 
credits remain responsible for ensuring that they have acquired and surrendered 
“credible” credits as an alternative to taking action to directly reduce their emissions. 
Failure to do so may trigger multiple layers of liability stemming from common law and 
statutory duties, including misrepresentation and misleading conduct. 
 
The Australian Competition and Consumer Commission has cautioned Australian 
entities from associating themselves with low or poor quality credits when seeking to 
make representations that they are offsetting their emissions.127 In determining the 
quality of an acquired offset, the ACCC refers to the certainty, longevity, and timeliness 
of the offset.128 The ACCC states that emission reductions from forestry offsets would 
be considered slow and potentially temporary.129 The ACCC further warns of the risks 
associated with forward-crediting where credits may not eventuate, and notes that poor 
risk-management may lead to misleading conduct.130 It recommends that offset 
providers be required to provide “some form of guarantee that purchased credits will be 
maintained and replaced if destroyed.”131 Additionality is another significant concern in 
the eyes of the ACCC. If the offsets do not represent an activity that goes beyond 
business as usual, then, the ACCC notes, “a particular reduction is not legitimately able 




Significant emphasis has been placed on the potential for market incentives to increase 
land based biosequestration projects, to enhance Australia’s carbon sinks, and to assist 
Australia in offsetting its national energy-based and industrial emissions. Given the 
potentially significant role of these sequestration measures within Australia’s climate 
change response, it seems critical for these offset credits to conform with the norms and 
standards that have been established by the international community. However, this has 
not occurred and the emerging regulatory approach in Australia raises a number of 
concerning legal issues. This paper has highlighted the disconnected legal relationship 
that exists between the principles of the Kyoto Protocol, the rules of the CPM, the 
creation of offset credits through the CFI, the rights of holders of carbon-offset credits, 
and the responsibilities imposed on their creators to maintain carbon-sequestration 
levels within Australia. It has also identified a number of anomalies in the design of the 
Australia CFI which raise serious questions regarding the likely effectiveness of this 
scheme as an offsetting mechanism. The key weakness lies in the legal treatment of 
additionality and permanence for Australian biosequestration projects. Significantly, the 
 
126 For example, under the National Carbon Offset Standard, Australian Government Department of 
Climate Change and Energy Efficiency, version 1 (2009), available at 
<http://www.climatechange.gov.au/government/initiatives/~/media/publications/carbon-
accounting/revised-NCOS-standard-2010-pdf.ashx>. 
127 Carbon Claims and the Trade Practices Act, Australian Competition and Consumer Commission, at 7, 
8 (2008). 
128 Ibid., 10. 
129 Ibid. 
130 Ibid., at 9. 
131 Ibid. 
132 Ibid., at 8. 
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CDM rules on additionality have been omitted in favour of provisions that deem the test 
of additionality to have been met. The Kyoto Protocol’s approach to the temporary 
crediting of biosequestration abatement has also been omitted in favour of permanent 
CFI credits for Australian biosequestration projects. The Australian CPM and CFI 
schemes have been designed with the intention of forming trading links with existing 
and future international and regional carbon trading markets. Given this, it is concerning 
to think that the creation, trade and surrender of CFI credits might undermine the 
effectiveness of those linked carbon markets and fail to make a meaningful contribution 
to global efforts to stabilise atmospheric concentrations of greenhouse gases.    
 
It seems that there is a clear need for further legal reform within Australia to ensure that 
appropriate legal responsibilities are imposed on the project proponents of 
biosequestration projects within Australia to ensure that carbon stocks are maintained in 
the longer term and that credible abatement occurs. Without this, the total effect of the 
Australian scheme could amount to little more than a complicated exercise in green-
washing. 
